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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20020738-CA
vs.

JEFFREY A. HEIL,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the denial of a Motion for New Trial entered from a
conviction for aggravated assault, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-103 (2003), in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Iron County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REMEW
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court plainly err where it ignored Utah's hearsay laws
and Mr. Heil's Sixth Amendment right to confront a hostile witness, by accepting Dr.
Delcore's unsigned, out-of-court statement into evidence and by publishing it to the jury?

Standard of Review: "A trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude
evidence and its determination typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of
discretion." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 9 6 , \ 20, 989 P.2d 52. However, where this issue
was not preserved by a timely objection in the trial court, it is determined under a plain
error standard. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
Issue No. 2: Did defense counsel's failure to adequately investigate Dr. Delcore's
testimony prior to trial and to object to the admission of Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement,
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel?
Standard of Review: "[C]laims of ineffective assistance of counsel involve a
mixed question of law and fact. Thus, 'where a trial court has previously heard a motion
based on ineffective assistance of counsel, reviewing courts are free to make an
independent determination of a trial court's conclusions.' However, the findings of fact
will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 873
(Utah 1993) (citations omitted).
Issue No. 3: Did the prosecution's deceptive act of authoring and submitting into
evidence a letter purported to be written by Dr. Delcore, without disclosing its tine origin,
constitute prosecutorial misconduct?
Standard of Review: Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for abuse
of discretion. State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ^J 22, 999 P.2d 7. This issue was preserved in
the hearing for new trial. See R. 314:404-11.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PRGWSIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are reproduced in
Addendum A:
U.S. Const. Amend. VI;
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (2003);
UtahR.Evid.705;
UtahR. Evid. 801;
Utah R. Evid. 803;
Utah R. Evid. 804.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 7,2001, Defendant, Jeffrey A. Heil, was charged by Information
with aggravated assault, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5103 (2003). After deliberations, on May 3, 2002, a jury convicted Mr. Heil as charged.
R. 314:357-58. On June 18, 2002, the trial court sentenced Mr. Heil to thirty-six months
probation, ordered him to serve 120 days in jail, and to pay medical expenses in addition
to a fine of $1,200.00. R. 157-59; 162-66; 314:363-94. Mr. Heil filed a Motion for New
Trial on June 28, 2002. R. 167-82. On August 13, 2002, the trial court issued an Order
Denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial. R. 253-61. Notice of Appeal was timely
filed on September 10, 2002. R. 281-82.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 25, 2001, Defendant, Jeffrey A. Heil, was watering his mature crops on
his farm located in Parowan, Utah, when he noticed that some cows had entered his
fenced property at the far north end of his field. R. 314:226-29. Fearing damage to his
haystack, Mr. Heil drove his vehicle down through the center of his field and herded the
3

cows back out of the north gate and onto the county road running parallel to his farm. R.
314:229, 230-31. A short time later, while moving another water line Mr. Heil noticed a
pickup truck moving slowly along the county road, carrying a bail of hay in its bed and
leading the cows down the road toward Mr. Heil5 s center gate. R. 314:229-33. Mr. Heil
recognized Fred Orton as the driver of the truck and owner of the cows. R. 314:230.
During the seven years since Mr. Heil bought his farm in 1994, Mr. Heil and his
neighbors experienced numerous problems with Mr. Orton allowing, and even forcing,
his starved and neglected cattle to enter their property. R. 314:38-39, 46-47, 74, 93, 226,
230.
"[IJfyou want to solve this problem [,] lefs solve it right no>v." Realizing that his
center gate was open, Mr. Heil drove across his property to the center gate. R. 314:231.
Mr. Orton slowly approached in his veliicle as Mr. Heil was in the process of closing one
side of the large swinging gate. R. 314:231-33. Mr. Heil informed Mr. Orton that, once
and for all, he was going to put a stop to Mr. Orton's starving of his animals by
contacting the brand inspector, the sheriffs department and the SPCA. R. 314:233. As
Mr. Heil then walked over on his property to close the other side to the gate, Mr. Orton
exited his vehicle and aggressively came toward Mr. Heil, threatening, "if you want to
solve this problem[,] let's solve it right now[!]" R. 314:233-34.
As Mr. Heil turned to grab the gate, Mr. Orton raised his right hand and swung a
twelve-inch crescent wrench at Mr. Heil's head. R. 314:234-35. The wrench had not
been visible until that time. R. 314:244. Mr. Heil turned and parried the blow with his
4

right wrist and ami. R. 314:237-39, 246-48. Mr. Orton was so close to Mr. Heil that he
had no opportunity to retreat. R. 314:235. Had Mr. Heil turned to run, Mr. Orton would
have struck him in the back of the head with the wrench. Id. Instinctively, Mr. Heil used
his martial arts and boxing training to subdue Mr. Orton with several blows from his fists.
R. 314:239-42, 246, 255-59. During the brief altercation, Mr. Orton continually and
aggressively pursued Mr. Heil. R. 314:242, 258-59.

Eventually, Mr. Orton got in his

vehicle and left R. 314:255-56.
Investigating the altereation. Several hours after Mr. Orton left, he notified the
police of the altercation. R. 314:34-35. Mr. Orton told police that he was attempting to
close Mr. Hell's gate when Mr. Heil tackled him from behind, grabbed his long hair, and
hit his right eye and jaw with a rock until Mr. Orton fell unconscious. R. 314:31-33, 4344, 70. Mr. Orton insisted that the altercation occurred outside Mr. Heil's property, in the
middle of the county road. R. 314:32, 44, 70. When he regained consciousness, Mr.
Orton claimed that Mr. Heil kicked him in the ribs and head. Id. Finally, Mr. Orton
stated that as he crawled to his vehicle, Mr. Heil threatened to kill him. R. 314:33. Mr.
Orton suffered a braised face and a broken jaw. R. 314:70-71, 78-79, S6-87.2
Deputies Ross Drishinski and Wayne Peterson investigated Mr. Orton?s claims.
R. 314:69-102. After taking Mr. Orton's statement, the deputies went to the scene of the

1

Given the brevity and helter-skelter nature of the altercation, Mr. Heil could not later
recall whether he had parried Mr. Orton's arm the wrench, or both, and exactly how
many times he had to strike Mr. Orton with his fists before Mr. Orton stopped his
aggressive pursuit. R. 314:238, 246-48, 249-55, 262.
5

altercation. R. 314:71-72, 92-93. Despite their detailed search, the deputies were unable
to locate the rock that Mr. Orton claimed was used in the altercation. R. 314:72-73, 80,
84, 90, 100-01. Furthermore, the deputies discovered scuffle marks on Mr. Heil's dirt
road, between five and ten feet from the near side of the county road, indicating that the
altercation actually occurred inside the gates on Mr. Heil's property, not in the middle of
the county road. R 314:76-77, 89-90, 97, 100. In a cooperative and straightforward
fashion, Mr. Heil explained his memory of the event. R. 314:73-75, 78, 93-95, 101.
Because of the nature of Mr. Orton's injuries, the deputies arrested Mr. Heil, handcuffed
and transported him to jail. R. 314:75-76, 78/
Next, Deputy Drishinski contacted Officer Dustin Orton, Mr. Orton's son,
requesting assistance on the case. R. 314:79. Together with Officer Orton, Deputy
Drishinski located Mr. Orton's pickup truck. R. 314:79-80. Inside Mr. Orton's vehicle,
Deputy Drishinski discovered a crescent wrench lying on the seat, next to the driver's
side. R. 314:80, 84-85.
Discovery^ of a scaphoid fracture. Having experienced a great deal of pain in his
right wrist and arm and a bruise on his left arm, after posting bail the following day, Mr.
Heil went to the emergency room for x-rays. R. 314:237-39.

3

Upon examination, Dr.

While at the jail, Mr. Heil's wife, Paula Heil, wrote Mr. Heil's statement, which he
signed and provided to police. R. 314:78. The following day, Mr. Heil gave police a
second statement of the event. R. 314: 81-84, 98, 250-55.
4
Although Mr. Heil was not fully aware that he had fractured his wrist after the
altercation, at the time he was handcuffed, Mr. Heil complained to the officers that his
wrist was hurting and requested that the officers take great care when fingerprinting him
6

Randy G. Delcore infomied Mr. Heil that he had suffered a scaphoid fracture of his right
wrist. R. 314:239, 242. Dr. Delcore commented to Mr. Heil that "it was one of the worst
scaphoid fractures that he had [treated]," and opined that the injury required immediate
surgery. R. 314:237-38, 242.
The trial At trial, in his opening statement, defense counsel, Harold Dent,
infomied the jury that Mr. HeiPs doctor would verify the defense's self-defense account
of the event, by testifying that the fracture to Mr. HeiPs hand and wrist w^as caused by
Mr. HeiPs efforts to defend himself from Mr. Orion's attack. R. 314:27.
The next day, in dialogue held outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge,
Judge Robert T. Braithwaite, revealed that he had received a "panic call" from Dr.
Delcore late in the afternoon of the first day of trial, May 2, 2003. R. 314:172. During
their telephone conversation, Dr. Delcore explained that he was served with a subpoena
only days before trial, and that he would be in surgery on the date he was required to
appear. Id. Judge Braithwaite told Dr. Delcore that the late service of the subpoena was
improper, given the fact that the case had been set for trial "for some time.5' Id. Upon
Judge Braithwaite's request, Dr. Delcore explained that Mr. Heil is his patient and that he
reported being struck by a wrench. Id. However, in his opinion, the injury more likely
occurred from throwing a punch. R. 314:172-73. Judge Braithwaite infomied Dr.
Delcore that rather than require him to be present at trial, he, defense counsel and the
prosecutor would telephone between surgeries to verify the substance of Dr. Delcore's
at the jail. R. 314:87-89, 98-99, 238, 248-49. In any event, Mr. Heil's scaphoid fracture
was later confirmed by Dr. Delcore. R. 314:239, 242.
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testimony. R. 314:173. After relating that event, Judge Braithwaite noted that from his
conversation with Dr. Delcore, it appeared as though "his testimony is going to be . . .
more helpful to the prosecution than to the defense." R. 314:174.
Later that day, following close of testimony, during an in-chambers conference,
Judge Braithwaite telephoned Dr. Delcore with both Mr. Dent and the prosecutor present.
R. 314:295-302. Judge Braithwaite asked Dr. Delcore to proffer his testimony, stating,
"[yjou're not under oath or anything but I'm sure you'll give an honest answer." Id,
Consistent with his previous statement, Dr. Delcore indicated that "a vast wealth
of.. . basic scientific data states that the scaphoid . . . fractures in almost only one
mechanism and that is with a hyperdorsal flexion injury of the wrist, meaining the wrist is
bent backwards forcibly. . ." R. 314:295-96. Moreover, Dr. Delcore opined that "[i]t is
extremely unlikely if not almost impossible to . . . fracture a scaphoid with a concussion
or a contusion mechanism injury [as claimed by Mr. Heil.]" R. 314:296-97. The
attorney's were then permitted to question Dr. Delcore. R. 314:296. During the
questioning, Dr. Delcore consistently stated his expert opinion that Mr. Heil's injury was
not caused by a blow from a wrench. R. 314:296-300. No questions were offered
regarding Dr. Delcore's relationship with the prosecution. See id.
As the in-chambers conference ended, the prosecution produced a document
purporting to be a statement from Dr. Delcore indicating his opinion that it was unlikely
that Mr. Heil's injury was caused by a blow from a wrench, and conversely "consistent
with Mr. Heil striking another person with his right hand[.]" R. 314:300-02. The
8

document was unsigned and a portion of it was handwritten by Judge Braithwaite. R.
314:302-04. A copy of that document is attached as Addendum B. Without any
objection from Mr. Dent, the prosecutor offered that document as an exhibit. R. 314:30003. Judge Braithwaite received the document into evidence, and ordered that it be read to
the jury. R. 314:303-04.
After deliberations, the jury found Mr. Heil guilty of aggravated assault. R.
314:357-58.
Defendant's motion for new trial. Following his conviction, Mr. Heil filed a
Motion for New Trial. R. 167-82. The motion focused primarily on the unsigned
document offered at trial, purporting to be Dr. Delcore's statement and expert opinion.
See id. At hearing on Mr. HeiPs motion, the prosecution admitted that Dr. Delcore and
Scott Burns, the Iron County Attorney, were "best friends," and that Mr. Burns had
actually authored the Delcore document. R. 314:404-12, 416-21.
Although Judge Braithwaite denied the Motion for New Trial, he expressed great
concern with regard to Dr. Delcore's testimony and alleged statement. R. 314:429-30. In
particular, Judge Braithwaite noted that defense counsel appeared to be "surprised by Dr.
Delcore's testimony, that it wasn't the same as what [Mr. Heil] had led him to believe."
R. 314:429. Judge Braithwaite further declared that Dr. Delcore's ''testimony was more
beneficial to the prosecution than to the defense[.]" and that had he appeared in court to
testify, his statements to the jury "would have fallen on the side of assisting the

9

prosecution, would have helped their case much more than it would have the defendant. .
. [and] increased] the chances of conviction[.]" R. 314:430.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
POINT I: The trial court plainly erred by accepting into evidence and publishing
Dr. Delcore's out-of-court statement. Because Dr. Delcore's written statement was
authored outside of trial, was offered at trial to prove that Mr. HeiPs injuries were not
suffered as a result of a blow from a wrench, and Dr. Delcore was not present at trial to
offer his opinion under oath, his statement constitutes hearsay under Utah law. Further,
Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement does not fall within any of the legally recognized
exceptions to Utah's hearsay rule. Where Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement is
inadmissible under longstanding Utah law, the trial court's actions were obvious error.
Additionally, acceptance of Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement offends the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The
Sixth Amendment guarantees Mr. Heil's constitutional right to confront and crossexamine Dr. Delcore in open court, face-to-face. Accordingly, the trial court's
acceptance of Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement without pemiitting confrontation was plain
eiTor.

Because Mr. Heil and Mr. Orton were the only two factual witnesses to the
altercation, the outcome of the case depended on the credibility of the witnesses. The
record indicates that absent the admission and publication of Dr. Delcore's hearsay
statement, Mr. Heil's credibility was superior to Mr. Orton's. Given that Dr. Delcore's
10

hearsay statement directly opposed Mr. HeiPs version of the altercation and cast serious
doubt on Mr. HeiPs credibility, the trial court's acceptance of the statement prejudiced
the outcome of Mr. HeiPs case.
POINT II: In light of the inadmissible nature of Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement,
defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately
investigate Dr. Delcore's testimony prior to trial, and by failing to object to the admission
of Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement. The record indicates that defense counsel was given
Dr. Delcore's name and address well before trial, yet defense counsel failed to even
attempt to contact Dr. Delcore until two days before trial. Had defense counsel properly
investigated Dr. Delcore's testimony, he would have discovered the doctor's friendship
with the Iron County Attorney, and thus, Dr. Delcore's obvious biases. More
importantly, had defense counsel timely objected to the admission of Dr. Delcore's
statement, it would have been excluded as inadmissible hearsay. As explained above in
Point I, defense counsel's inactions prejudiced the outcome of Mr. HeiPs trial, and
warrant a new trial.
POINT III: Irrespective of whether the trial court plainly erred in accepting and
publishing Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement, the prosecution committed prosecutorial
misconduct by fabricating the Delcore document and by not disclosing its true origin to
the court. At the hearing for new trial, the prosecutor admitted that the Delcore document
was actually authored by the Iron Count) Attorney. Where that fact was not disclosed to
the court at the time of trial and where the document constituted inadmissible hearsay, the
11

Delcore document was improperly placed before the jury. Furthermore, the prosecutor's
conduct constituted fraud on the court, and therefore, prosecutorial misconduct.
The record reveals that the Delcore document was a crucial piece of evidence that
was considered by the jury in its decision to convict Mr. Heil. Accordingly, based on the
prosecution's egregious misconduct, Mr. Heil's case should be remanded for new trial.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN THE FACE OF UTAH'S HEARSAY RULES AND
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
CONFRONT A HOSTILE WITNESS, THE TRIAL
COURT PLAINLY ERRED BY ACCEPTING DR.
DELCORE'S UNSIGNED STATEMENT INTO
EMDENCE, THUS CAUSING IRREPRABLE HARM
TO DEFENDANT'S CASE
The trial court's carte blanche acceptance of Dr. Delcore's unsigned statement into
evidence, raises two fundamental questions: (1) whether Dr. Delcore's statement
constituted inadmissible hearsay; and (2) whether the admission of Dr. Delcore's
statement violated Mr. Heil's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Because neither of these issues were the subject of a timely
objection from defense counsel at trial, there are addressed on appeal under a plain error
analysis. Plain error is established by demonstrating that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). Based on Utah law, constitutional law, and the
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instant facts, the trial court plainly erred in allowing Dr. Delcore's statement to be
admitted into evidence and published to the jury, thus prejudicially affecting the outcome
of Mr. HeiPs jury trial.
A.

Dr. Delcore's unsigned, out-of-court statement constitutes inadmissible
hearsay under Utah law, and thus, the trial court erred in allowing its
admission into evidence.
Utah law defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial. . . offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c). That statement may constitute either an oral or written
assertion. Utah R. Evid. 801(a). Consistent with that definition, because Dr. Delcore's
written statement was authored outside of trial (see R. 314:404-12, 416-21), was offered
at trial to prove that Mr. Heil's injuries were not suffered as a result of a blow from a
wrench (see R. 300-04), and Dr. Delcore was not present at trial to offer his opinion
under oath (see id.), his statement constitutes hearsay under Utah law. See Utah R. Evid.
801.
Notwithstanding the hearsay nature of Dr. Delcore's statement, hearsay evidence
is admissible if it falls under the legally recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. See
Salt Lake City v. AJires, 2000 UT App 4 27, 9 P.3d 769. Of the various exceptions to
the hearsay rule only four need be examined in the instant case: (1) Rule 803(4),
statements offered for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment; (2) Rule 803(6),
records of regularly conducted activity; (3) Rule 804(a), statements offered where the
declarant is unavailable; and (4) Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), the residual exception to
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the hearsay rule. However, the record evidence indicates that Dr. Delcore's unsigned
statement falls outside each of those exceptions, and therefore, constitutes inadmissible
hearsay.
(1)

Where Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement consists of his medical opinion
rather than a statement made to him by Mr. Heil for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment, it falls outside Rule 803(4), Utah Rules
of Evidence.

In general, u [statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the
inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment^]" are admissible forms of hearsay. Utah
R. Evid. 803(4). However, Rule 803(4) applies only to statements made by the patient to
the physician during treatment and diagnosis, and does not permit the introduction of outof-court statements by physicians as to the treatment prescribed or the diagnosis reached.
See State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, T[ 27, 973 P.2d 404; Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 97980 (Utah 1993). Accordingly, where Dr. Delcore's out-of-court statement substantially
constitutes his opinion as to the cause of Mr. Heil's injury (see Addendum B), it does not
fall within the Rule 803(4) exception to the hearsay rule.5

^ Although Dr. Delcore's out-of-court statement does include the assertion that "Mr. Heil
reported to [Dr. Delcore] that he received [his] injury by being struck with a wrench by
another person[,]" the remainder of the statement constitutes Dr. Delcore's opinion as to
the cause of that injury. See Addendum B. In any event, that singular sentence in Dr.
Delcore's statement is not disputed, and is consistent with Mr. Heil's testimony. See R.
314:237-39,246-48.
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(2)

Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement is not the type of opinion and
diagnosis contemplated under Rule 803(6), Utah Rules of Evidence.

Under Rule 803(6), "[a] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation. . . of. .
. opinions and diagnoses, made at or near the time by . . . a person with knowledge, if
kept m the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular
practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian[,]" is admissible hearsay.
Utah R. Evid. 803(6). However, where Dr. Delcore's out-of-court statement was not
made "at or near the time [of diagnosis]" (see R. 314:404-12, 416-21), wras not a typical
medical record "kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity" (see
Addendum B), and was not offered by "testimony of the custodian" (see R. 314:300-04),
it does not fall within the Rule 803(6) hearsay exception.

(3)

Because Dr. Delcore was not "unavailable" under Rule 804(a), Utah
Rules of Evidence, his hearsay statement is inadmissible.

Rule 804(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, lists five instances in which a declarant may
be deemed "unavailable" for the purposes of this exception to the hearsay rule. The five
instances include situations in which the declarant (1) "is exempted by ruling of the court
on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's
statement;" or (2) "persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so;" or (3) "testifies to a lack of
memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement;" or (4) "is unable to be present
or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or
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infirmity;" or (5) "is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's
statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other
reasonable means." Utah R. Evid. 804(a). None of those situations apply here.
In the instant case, although the trial court excused Dr. Delcore from testifying, the
reasoning was not grounded on privilege. See R. 314:173, 300. Rather, the reason for
Dr. Delcore5s excused absence was to accommodate his work schedule. See id. Dr.
Delcore did not refuse to testify at trial, nor did the trial court order him to do so. See R.
314:172-74, 295-302; see also State v. White, 671 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1983) (holding
that witness must assert his Fifth Amendment privilege under oath in response to a
question in order to be "unavailable" under Rule 804(a)(2)). Also, Dr. Delcore did not
indicate that he had lack of memory of the subject matter. See id.; see also State v.
Marcum, 750 P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1988) ("[A] witness should be found unavailable
under rule 804(a)(3) only if he insists that he has no recollection of the alleged crime.").
Additionally, the reason for Dr. Delcore's absence was not based on his death or
his then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity. See id.; see also State v. Barela,
779 P.2d 1140, 1144-45 (Utah App. 1989) (recognizing that "unavailability" under Rule
804(a)(4) pertains only to the witness' present health situation, and that "mere passing
discomfort or inconvenience does not satisfy the [rule's] requirements^]"). Finally,
although Dr. Delcore was absent from the hearing, there is no record indication that the
prosecution attempted to procure Dr. Delcore's sworn testimony through process or
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another reasonable means. See record generally, see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13
(Utah 2003) (outlining the prosecution's notice rules for presenting expert testimony at
trial, requiring "not less than 30 days [notice to the defense] before trial[.]").
Where none of the five instances of witness unavailability apply to the present
case, Dr. Delcore's out-of-court statement does not fall within the Rule 804(a) exception
to the hearsay rule, and therefore, constitutes inadmissible hearsay.
(4)

Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement does not satisfy the notice
requirement of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), Utah Rules of Evidence,
and therefore, is inadmissible.

The residual exception to Utah's hearsay rules is found in Rules 803(24) and
804(b)(5), Utah Rules of Evidence. Because Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) are phrased
identically, this Court has detemiined that their interpretation and application is the same.
See State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, H 22 n. 2, 32 P.3d 967. The notice provisions of
Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) require that "a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in
advance of the trial... to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to
meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including
the name and address of the declarant." Utah R. Evid. 803(24) and 804(b)(5). The
reasoning behind this requirement is to allow the opposing party the opportunity7 to
"prepare[] to contest the applicability of the residual exception and the general
trustworthiness of the hearsay statement." Webster, 2001 UT App 238,1} 21.
Accordingly, where the proponent fails to provide advance notice of its intent to rely on
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those exceptions to the hearsay rules, and notice of the particulars of that statement, the
evidence is inadmissible. See Id. ("[T]he very purpose of the notice provision . . . 'to
afford the adverse party an opportunity to attack the statement's trustworthiness,5 . . . is
frustrated when notice of intent to rely on a residual exception is not given.") (Citation
omitted).
Here, the record contains no pre-trial notice from the State of its intent to rely on
the residual hearsay exception, and of its intent to rely on Dr. Delcore as an expert
witness. See record generally. Instead, the defense was first made aware of Dr.
Delcore's unsigned statement during an in-chambers conference following the second,
and final, day of testimony. See R. 300-04. The reading of Dr. Delcore 5s statement was
the last piece of evidence presented to the jury. See id. Accordingly, where Dr.
Delcore's statement falls outside the notice requirements of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5),
it constitutes inadmissible hearsay.
Furthermore, the mere fact that Mr. Heil was aware of Dr. Delcore's testimony
does not satisfy the notice requirement of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5). Indeed, "[t]he
plain language of [Rule 803(24)] requires that an opposing party have more than mere
notice of the existence of particular evidence. It requires actual notice of a proponent's
intent to offer specific hearsay evidence and the particulars of that evidence." Webster,
2001 UT App 238, % 18; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (Utah 2003) (requiring
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"not less than 30 days [notice to the defense] before trial" of the prosecution's intent to
use expert testimony).
In sum, because Dr. Delcore's unsigned, out-of-court statement constitutes hearsay
that does not fit within any of the legally recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, the
trial court erred in accepting the statement into evidence and by publishing it to the jury.
B.

Because Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement was not subject to crossexamination, The trial court violated Mr. HeiPs fundamental constitutional
right to confront and cross-examine an adverse witness.
Notwithstanding the fact that Dr. Delcore's unsigned out-of-court statement

constitutes inadmissible hearsay, it's admission into evidence also violated the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 402 (Utah 1994) cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995); see also
State v. Moosman, 19 A P.2d 474, 479-80 (Utah 1990) (Regardless of whether an
extrajudicial statement might be admissible under a hearsay exception, that statement
does not automatically pass constitutional muster). As Judge Braithwaite noted, Dr.
Delcore's medical opinion ran contrary to Mr. Heil's self-defense theory of the case (see
R. 314:174), and therefore, Dr. Del core must be considered an adverse and hostile
witness to the defense.

The Confrontation Clause of "[t]he Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal
defendant the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses." State v. Leonard,
101 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1985); see U.S. Const, amend VI. "There are few subjects,
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perhaps, upon which [the Supreme Court] and other courts have been more nearly
unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and crossexamination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is
this country's constitutional goal.'" Id. at 655-56 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
405 (1965). "'Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a
witness and the truth of his testimony are testedf,]'" Id. at 655 (citing Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308, 316, (1974)). "The right to test the believability of a witness on crossexamination includes the right to show a witness' possible bias or interest. The exposure
of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination." Id. at 656 (citing Greene v. Mc
Elroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
"[I]n order to admit hearsay statements at trial when the hearsay declarant is not
present for cross-examination, the State must show [(1)] that the declarant is
unavailable^] and [(2)] that the statement at issue 'bears adequate indicia of reliability.5"
Salt Lake City v. Alires, 2000 UT App 244, \ 20 n. 3, 9 P.3d 769 (quoting State v.
Menzies, 889 P.2d at 402 and Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
(1)

Dr. Delcore was not constitutionally unavailable to testify at trial.

"[Constitutional unavailability is found only when it is 'practically impossible to
produce the witness in court.5" Menzies, 889 P.2d at 402 (citing State v. Webb, 779 P.2d
1108, 1113 (Utah 1989) (separate opinion of Zimmerman, J.)). "In short, every
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reasonable effort must be made to produce the witness." Id. Although the record
indicates that Dr. Delcore had surgery scheduled for the day of trial, he had enough time
in between the surgeries to converse with the judge, defense counsel, and the prosecutor
on a conference call, and to answer questions. See R. 314:172, 295-302. Furthermore,
even though Dr. Delcore reported that the surgeries couldn't wait, the record gives no
indication that the surgery to be perfomied was a matter of life and death, nor any
indication that it was practically impossible for Dr. Delcore to merely delay the surgeries
by an hour or two to accommodate his testifying at trial, and perform the surgery that
same day. See id.; see also Barela, 779 P.2d at 1145 ("[M]ere passing discomfort or
inconvenience does not satisfy the requirements of. . . the confrontation clause."). The
availability of another orthopedic surgeon to briefly stand in for Dr. Delcore during the
surgery was not discussed. See id. Moreover, the most reasonable and practical solution
would have been for the State to request a continuance to ensure Dr. Delcore's presence
at trial. Accordingly, the State failed to make "every reasonable effort... to produce
"[Dr. Delcore]." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 402.
The fact that defense counsel was able to briefly question Dr. Delcore during the
in-chambers discussion is of no importance under the Sixth Amendment. The United
States Supreme Court has consistently affirmed that the right of confrontation means a
right to personal, face-to-face confrontation. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-21
(1988); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987); California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concumng); zn&Dowdellv. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330
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(1911). Consistent with that binding precedent, the Utah Supreme Court has long held
that "the word 'confront5 does not simply secure to the accused the privilege of
examining witnesses in his behalf, but is in affirmance of the rule of the common law,
that in trial by jury the witnesses must be present before the jury and accused, so that he
may be confronted, that is, put face to face." State v. Mannion, 57 P. 542, 543-44 (1899);
see also State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 177-79 (Utah 1989) ("Face-to-face confrontation
is far from a frivolous nicety.") (Stewart, J., dissenting). Accordingly, Mr. HeiFs
constitutional right to confrontation included the right to cross-examine Dr. Delcore faceto-face before the jury, and not merely by telephone.
(2)

Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement was unreliable.

Next, the reliability of Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement must be determined. See
Menzies, 889 P.2d at 402. "'Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must
be excluded at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."5
State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
As noted in Subsection A above, Dr. Delcore5s statement does not fall within one of the
legally recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Furthermore, the record indicates that
Dr. Delcore's statement lacks any particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
The record is silent as to the State's showing of the reliability of Dr. Delcore's
hearsay statement. To the contrary, the record reflects that Dr. Delcore's statement was
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unsigned and was authored by the Iron County Attorney, Scott Bums, Dr. Delcore's best
friend. See Addendum B; R. 314:404-12, 416-21. Had Dr. Delcore testified at trial, the
extent to which his friendship with Mr. Bums biased Dr. Delcore's opinion would have
been open to cross-examination. Also, based on his first meeting with Dr. Delcore, Mr.
Heil's understanding of Dr. Delcore's initial opinion was that the blow from the wrench
caused his scaphoid fracture. See R. 314:27 (Mr. Heil's understanding of Dr. Delcore's
initial opinion is apparent in Mr. Dent's opening statement to the jury, which was gleaned
from Mr. Heil's representation of his medical treatment.). Accordingly, Mr. Heil had a
constitutional right to put before the jury the possible reasons that Dr. Delcore may have
changed his opinion from that initially stated.
In addition, Rule 705, Utah Rules of Evidence, indicates that while an expert
witness need not testify regarding the underlying facts and data supporting his opinion, he
u

may in any event be required to disclose [that information] on cross-examination." Utah

R. Evid. 705. Dr. Delcore's statement indicates the possibility that a blow from a wrench
was the cause of Mr. Heil's injury. See Addendum B. Effective cross-examination may
have revealed flaws in the facts and data supporting Dr. Delcore's opinion that a wrench
was not the cause of Mr. Heil's injury, and highlighted the reasons for the alternative
possibility mentioned. Therefore, given the uncertainty of Dr. Delcore's hearsay
statement, it is unreliable. In any event, where the expert witness is unavailable for crossexamination, compliance with Rule 705 is seemingly impossible.
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Most disturbing, however, were the facts that a portion of Dr. Delcore 5s statement
was handwritten in by the trial judge, and that the statement was affirmed by telephone
conversation that was expressly taken without oath. See R. 314:296, 304. Clearly such a
statement cannot be deemed to have the adequate indicia of reliability.
Given the fact that the record does not reflect that "every reasonable effort" was
made to facilitate Dr. Delcore's testimony at trial, and that the hearsay statement offered
was unreliable, Dr. Delcore was not "constitutionally unavailable" and Mr. Heil's
essential and fundamental constitutional right to confront and cross-examine Dr. Delcore
under oath was violated. "Because cross-examination for bias is 'so vital a constitutional
right,5 and was unduly restricted in this case," the trial court erred by allowing Dr.
Delcore's hearsay statement into evidence. Leonard, 107 P.2d at 656.
C.

In light of the express language of Utah's hearsay rules and Utah Court's
longstanding recognition of the requirements of the Confrontation Clause,
admission of Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement was obvious error.
The next step in a plain error analysis requires a showing that the error was

obvious. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. "To show obviousness of the error, [a defendant]
must show that the law was clear at the time of trial." State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19,
^f 6, 18 P.3d 1123. As noted above, Dr. Delcore's statement—an unsigned, out-of-court
statement, offered to prove that Mr. Heil's injury did not result from a blow by a wrench—clearly constituted hearsay under Rule 801. See Utah R. Evid. 801. That the statement
did not fall within any legally recognized exception to the hearsay rule, was equally
obvious under the express language of Utah's evidentiary rules. See Utah R. Evid. 803;
24

804. Where the Utah Rules of Evidence were before the trial court at the time of trial,
and their express language indicates that Dr. Delcore's out-of-court statement was
inadmissible hearsay, acceptance of the statement into evidence was obvious error. See
State v. Perez, 946 P.2d 724, 732 (Utah App. 1997) (error is obvious when it is contrary
to the express language of evidentiary rules).
The longstanding requirements of the Confrontation Clause were also clearly
violated in that Mr. Heil was not given an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Delcore
while under oath and before the jury. See U.S. Const, amend VI. Aside from the clear
language of the Sixth Amendment and the numerous federal cases, Utah courts have long
honored the requirements of the Sixth Amendment's express right to confront a hostile
witness. See Leonard, 707 P.2d at 655; Menzies, 889 P.2d at 402; Webb, 779 P.2d at
1113; and Drawn, 791 P.2d at 894.6 Accordingly, Mr. Heil's constitutional right to
confront and cross-examine Dr. Delcore was fundamental and clear.
Additionally, on the record, the trial court acknowledged that Mr. HeiPs selfdefense theory was "a crucial part of [his] defense." R. 314:106. The court was also
aware that Dr. Delcore's testimony would prejudice the defense. Specifically, after
conversing with Dr. Delcore, Judge Braithwaite stated that it appeared as though "[Dr.
Delcore's] testimony is going to be . . . more helpful to the prosecution than to the
defense." R. 314:174. In light of the trial court's clear awareness of the prejudicial affect
6

See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66; Pointer, 380 U.S. at 405; Davis, 415 U.S. at 316; Button v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 82 (1970); and California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970).
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that Dr. Delcore's testimony would have on Mr. HeiPs case and of Mr. HeiPs
constitutional right to cross-examine Dr. Delcore, the court's carte blanche acceptance of
the hearsay statement into evidence and order that it be published to the jury constituted
plain error.
D.

The trial court's error in admitting and publishing Dr. Delcore's hearsay
statement was prejudicial to Mr. HeiPs case.
The final determination in a plain error analysis requires a showing that the error

prejudiced the outcome of the trial. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Specifically, a
defendant must show that absent the error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result, or that the error was "of sufficient magnitude that it affect[ed] [the
defendant's] substantial rights." State v. Verde, lib P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989)
(quotation and citation omitted). Here, the trial record indicates that until Dr. Delcore's
expert opinion was offered to the jury, the evidence favored acquittal. Additionally, the
trial court's admission of Dr. Delcore's statement was an error of sufficient magnitude
that it affected defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.
(1)

Absent Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement, there was a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for Mr. Heil.

Mr. Heil and Mr. Orton were the only eyewitnesses to the altercation. See R. 2834, 229-35. Accordingly, the jury's decision was necessarily based on which witness was
more credible. At trial, Mr. Orton initially testified that the altercation did not occur on
Mr. Heil's property. R. 314:48. He later changed his testimony when he was shown a
photograph indicating scuffle marks on the dirt road between 5 and 10 feet inside Mr.
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HeiFs property. R. 314:47-52, 56-57, 76-78, 89-90, 97, 100. Claiming that he could
somehow see an object allegedly coming from behind his view, Mr. Orton also claimed
that lie was struck in the face with a rock. R. 314:43-44. However, despite a diligent
search by police no rock was recovered. R. 314:61-62; 72-73, 89-90. Instead, consistent
with Mr. Heil's description of the incident, a large crescent wrench was found on the
front seat of Mr. Orton's vehicle that was at the scene of the altercation. R. 314:39-40,
45, 59-61.7
Additionally, Mr. Orton insistently testified that he "go[es] out of [his] wTay" to
keep his cattle off other's property. R. 314:39, 41, 45-46. However, a videotape of
defendant herding his cattle across Mr. Heil's property was introduced into evidence
along with statements from four other neighbors who had numerous problems with Mr.
Orton permitting his starved and neglected cattle to go onto their property. See R.
314:118-30, 198-208, 221-25. Most telling, however, was Scott Holyoak and Kenny
Rosberg's testimony. Mr. Holyoak, a neighbor to Mr. Orton, testified that Mr. Orton
initiated a fight and punched him in the nose over a cattle dispute. See R. 314:208-16.
Kenny Rossberg, an friend of Mr. Orton, testified that Mr. Orton was easily angered and
Although Mr. Orton suffered a broken jaw, at trial his attending physician, Dr. Robert
D. Pearson, acknowledged the possibility that injury occurred from being struck with a
fist rather than a rock. See R. 314:191-95. Furthermore, consistent with a blow from a
fist, Dr. Pearson noted that there were no lacerations on Mr. Orton's face or jaw. See R.
314:190-91. More importantly, despite a diligent search b} police, no rock was
recovered from the scene of the event. See R. 72-73, 89-90: 314: 61-62, 186. Where Mr.
Heil was trained in martial arts and capable of inflicting serious blows with his hands,
and Mr. Orton's version of the events was inconsistent with the lack physical evidence
found at the scene of the event, Mr. Heil's self-defense theory of the case was sound. See
R. 314:239-41.
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had a violent disposition. R. 314:216-21. Although he testified in rebuttal, Mr. Orton did
not deny any of those allegations. See R. 314:283-87.
In response, the prosecution attempted to show inconsistencies between the
statements that Mr. Heil had given to police and his trial testimony, including the number
of punches he threw, whether he parried the blow of Mr. Orton5s arm, the wrench, or
both, and whether he complained about his injury to his wrist when handcuffed. See R.
314:243-60. However, Mr. Hell's responses diffused those attempts. Mr. Heil indicated
that in the brief mayhem of the altercation he reasonably did not take count of the number
of punches that he threw or what part of Mr. Orton's arm or wrench he parried, and that
he did complain about his wrist hurting when he was placed in handcuffs. See id.
Consistent with that explanation, Deputy Drishinski admitted that in his experience, it
was not uncommon for an individual involved in a fight to later lack recollection as to
exactly how many punches he had thrown or received. See R. 314:87-88. The deputy
also admitted that at the jail, Mr. Heil did complain about his injury. See R. 314:74.8
The prosecution also introduced two witnesses who claimed that Mr. Heil had a
violent disposition. See R. 314:264-78. However, one of those witnesses, Dennis Gaede,
Mr. Heil's former employee, admitted that his memory of the five-year-old encounter
with Mr. Heil was weak, and that although Mr. Heil raised his voice, he did not attempt
any violence. See R. 314:269-78. Later, it became clear that the reason Mr. Heil showed

8

In any event, notwithstanding whether Mr. Heil complained about his injury at the time
he was handcuffed, medical evidence confimied that his wrist was fractured as a result of
the altercation. See R. 314:237-38, 242.
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anger toward Mr. Gaede was for mining several of Mr. Heil's expensive diesel engines
and because Mr. Gaede deliberately stole a valuable business contract. See R. 314: 29293. The second witness, William Larsen, readily admitted that Mr. Heil had a judgment
against him for livestock trespass, pasture fees and conversion of hay, a discernable bias
(see R. 314:264-68, 291-92). Accordingly, prosecution's attempts to show that Mr. Heil
wras deceptive and violent were weak.
The only substantial piece of evidence that could have persuaded the jury to
believe Mr. Orton's story was the Delcore document, purportedly written and offered by
a respected and trustworthy medical doctor, and seemingly endorsed by the trial court.
See R. 302-04; see also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 189 (Utah 1990) (where
testimony affects the credibility of a fact witness who gave direct evidence, the testimony
affects the "entire evidential*}7 picture."). The statement casts substantial doubt on Mr.
Heil's self-defense theory of his case, and gravely undermines his credibility7. In
particular, Mr. Heil testified that he parried Mr. Orton's blow, causing his wrist to
fracture. See R. 314:232-42. The Delcore document states that the opposite occurred;
"the injury is consistent with Mr. Heil striking another person with his right hand[.]" R.
314:303. The prejudice of this document was so clear that even the trial court stated that
Dr. Delcore's statement was damaging to Mr. Heil's "crucial" self-defense theory. See
R. 314:106, 174. Further, Dr. Delcore's statement was the last piece of evidence from a
two-day trial, and therefore, fresh in the jurors' minds as the}7 entered deliberation. See
R. 314:302-04.
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In light of the substantial record evidence revealing that Mr. Orton was not
credible and the fact that Mr. Heil was more believable, prior to the admission and
publication of Dr. Delcore's opinion, there was a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for Mr. Heil. Accordingly, the trial court's error in admitting and
publishing Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement gravely prejudiced the outcome of Mr. Heil's
trial. See Verde, 770 P.2d at 122.
(2)

The trial court's error in admitting and publishing Dr. Delcore's
hearsay statement was of sufficient magnitude that it affected the
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.

As illustrated above in Subsection B, Mr. Heil was stripped of his constitutional
right to confront and cross-examine Dr. Delcore in open court. This error substantially
affected Mr. Heil's right to a fair trial. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. at 1019 ("confrontation
is essential to fairness"). The Utah Supreme Court has long held that "most importantly,
the fact finder must be given the opportunity to make an informed judgment concerning
the weight to be given the expert opinion. Preventing a [doctor] from testifying about the
bases of his expert opinion vastly increases the danger of insulating the [doctor] from
scrutiny and misleading the jury with conclusory statements." State v. Schreuder, 726
P.2d 1215, 1224 (Utah 1986). In fact, "only when the bases for an expert's opinion are
stated [in court] can cross-examination be relied on to expose any unreliability in such
information bases." Id. at 1224-25.
In this case, because of the trial court's unequivocal acceptance of Dr. Delcore's
hearsay statement and publication of the statement to the jury, the jury was not given "the
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opportunity to make an informed judgment concerning the weight to be given [Dr.
Delcore's] expert opinion." Id. at 1224. Instead, the jury was left to conclude that the
opinion was unchallenged and conclusive fact. Because Dr. Delcore's opinion was not
on a collateral issue, his hearsay statement had a discemable and substantial affect on the
principal theory of Mr. Heils case—self defense. In essence, the trial court's actions
"insulat[ed] [Dr. Delcore] from scrutiny and misled[] the jury[,]" thus masldng any
unreliability in Dr. Delcore's opinion and resulting in substantial prejudice to the
outcome of Mr. HeiPs trial. Id.
Additionally, the record fact that Dr. Delcore and Mr. Bums, the Iron County
Prosecutor, are "best friends" is undisputed bias. See R. 314:404-12, 416-21. Mr. Bums
involvement in authoring Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement is equally troubling. See id.
"[The Utah Supreme] Court has repeatedly recognized the critical effect that a fact
finder's perception of a witness' bias may have on the outcome of a case." Id. (citing
State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228, 1233 (Utah 1980); State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386,
1388 (Utah 1977)). Moreover, the High Court has expressly held that "[fjull exposure of
a witness' bias or prejudice is essential if a jury is to be able to fully assess the existence
and extent of the witness' bias." Leonard, 707 P.2d at 656. Accordingly, the trial court's
plain error prevented Mr. Heil from exposing those disturbing factual biases on crossexamination, a right that is "essential" and prejudicial to a fair trial. See id.
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In sum, the trial court's error in accepting and publishing Dr. Delcore's hearsay
statement and in stripping Mr. Heil of his constitutional right to confrontation, was both
obvious and prejudicial. Given the fact that absent the trial court's plain error, there was
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for Mr. Heil, and that the plain error
was "of sufficient magnitude that it affect[ed] [Mr. Heil's] substantial rights[J" Mr. Heil
should be afforded the opportunity for a new trial. See Verde, 770 P.2d at 122.
POINT II
DEFENSE COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO ADEQUATELY
INVESTIGATE DR. DELCORE'S TESTIMONY PRIOR
TO TRIAL AND BY FAILING TO TIMELY OBJECT
TO THE ADMISSION OF DR. DELCORE'S HEARSAY
STATEMENT AT TRIAL
Notwithstanding the trial court's plain error in accepting and publishing Dr.
Delcore's hearsay statement, defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance on two
grounds: (1) by failing to investigate Dr. Delcore's testimony prior to trial; and (2) by
failing to timely object to the admission of Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement at trial.
Proof of ineffective assistance of counsel requires analysis of a two-prong test.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984). "[A] defendant must first
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^f 19, 12
P.3d 92 (citations and quotations omitted). "Second, [a] defendant must show that
counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the
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case." Id. In other words, a defendant must demonstrate that "counsel's error prejudiced
him by depriving him of a fair trial and producing a verdict in which [the appellate court]
has no confidence." State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 22, % 15, 997 P.2d 314, cert, denied,
4 P.3d 1289. Here, the record evidence indicates that defense counsel's ineffective
conduct satisfies both those prongs.
A.

Defense counsel's inactions fell below the reasonable standard for
professional conduct
To show deficient performance, "a defendant must 'identify the acts or omissions'

which, under the circumstances, 'show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.'" Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688-89). To do so, a defendant must point to specific instances in the record
where counsel's assistance was inadequate. State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, \ 58, 57
P.3d 1159. Furthermore, a defendant "'must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Templin,
805 P.2d at 186 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) (additional citations and quotations
omitted).
(1)

Defense Counsel failed to adequately investigate Dr. Delcore's
testimony prior to trial.

Dr. Delcore's statement indicates that he treated Mr. Heil on August 26, 2001. R.
314:303. The record indicates that two weeks later, defense counsel first appeared in the
case. R. 3-5. During their discussions, Mr. Heil made defense counsel aware of Dr.
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Delcore's involvement in the case and that Dr. Delcore was a potential witness. See R.
314:173. On April 30, 2002, over eight months after Dr. Delcore first examined Mr.
Heil, defense counsel served a subpoena on Dr. Delcore. See R. 314:173. Apparently,
Dr. Delcore did not receive the subpoena until the day before trial. See Addendum B; R.
314:172-73. In an in-chambers conversation with the judge, defense counsel indicated
that lie had made "efforts to talk to Dr. Delcore[.]" R. 314:173. However, the only effort
specified was a telephone message left for Dr. Delcore just prior to trial. See R. 314:17374.
In State v. Templin, the Utah Supreme Court expressly held that where counsel
fails to adequately investigate the underlying facts of a case, including the testimony of
prospective witnesses, "counsel's performance cannot fall within the 'wide range of
reasonable professional assistance."' Templin, 805 P.2d at 188 (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 686). Specifically, the high Court found that Templin was denied effective
assistance of counsel because his counsel did not contact several potential witnesses
named by the defendant. Id. at 187-88. The Templin Court further held that "a decision
not to investigate cannot be considered a [valid] tactical decision[,] and "[i]t is only after
an adequate inquiry has been made that counsel can make a reasonable decision to call or
not to call particular witnesses for tactical reasons." Id.
The precedent established in Templin has direct application in the instant case.
Here, the record indicates that defense counsel was given Dr. Delcore's name as a
potential witness and Dr. Delcore's telephone number, over eight months prior to trial.
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See R. 314:173-74. Notwithstanding that fact, defense counsel failed to contact Dr.
Delcore or investigate the substance of his testimony prior to trial. See id. Apparently, it
was only after serving a subpoena two days before trial, that defense counsel even
attempted to telephone Dr. Delcore. See id. The record clearly reveals that Dr.
Delcore's opinion as to the cause of Mr. Heil's injur)/ wTas detrimental to his self-defense
account of the altercation, and thus, that Dr. Delcore possessed critical information as to
the underlying facts of the Mr. Heil's case. See R. 314:174, 429-30. Accordingly, under
the Templin Court's ruling, where defense counsel's one feeble attempt to telephone Dr.
Delcore constituted inadequate investigation, deficient performance is established. See
Templin, 805 P.2d at 188; see also State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Utah 1993)
(sufficient performance requires that counsel adequately investigate the underlying facts
of a case); State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Utah App. 1989) ("'the Sixth
Amendment imposes on counsel a duty to investigate, because reasonably effective
assistance must be based on professional decisions[,] and informed legal choices can be
made only after investigation of options.'") (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 680).9
Furthermore, under Templin, defense counsel's decision not to investigate Dr.
Delcore's testimony cannot be viewed as a valid tactical decision. See Templin, 805 P.2d

9

While it may be generally true that an attomey is entitled to rely on representations
made by a client, see Milliner v. Elmer Fox and Co., 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974),
Templin clearly indicates that in a criminal case in which a defendant's liberty is at stake,
an attorney has an affmnative duty to adequately investigate the underlying material facts
of that case, including the testimony of prospective witnesses. Templin, 805 P.2d at 188.
Otherwise, "counsel's performance cannot fall within the 'wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.'" Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).
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at 187-8S Gn en the fact thai defense counsel was pio^ ided Di Delcoie5s name months
befoie tnal counsel 5s appaient decision not to contact Dr Delcore several months before
trial can onl> be viewed as neglectful See Tvlei, 850 P 2d at 1255 ("[A.] decision not to
investigate cannot receive the same deference afforded a tactical decision ") Had
defense counsel timely contacted and lnten lew ed Dr Delcoie regarding his participation
m the case, the recoid fact that Di Delcore was involved with the prosecution would
ha\ e been evident Given that know ledge, even if the prosecution had placed Dr Delcoie
on the witnesses stand at tnal, his bias would have been easil} made clear to the jury
\ccoidmgly, defense counsel5s choice not to tunel) and adequately investigate Dr
Delcore's testimony ^ as not a valid tactical decision See id 5 see also Qestam, 111 P 2d
at 1090 (ucounsel has a dut} to make reasonable investigations oi to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary") (citations, quotations, and
emphasis omitted)
(2)

Defense counsel failed to timel} object at trial.

During the second day of trial, following their m-chambers inten ie^ with Dr
Delcore, the prosecution pioduced the document alleged to be Dr Delcoie's statement
See R 314 295-300. \t that point, the judge remarked, "Hov do you want to address
what we just I esoh ed? One of you i ead it, just publish it, ha7^ e the cleik i ead it, or v^ hat?
I'm

not going to lead it " R 314 300 The piosecutor dnected that the statement

should be lead by the cleik and admitted into evidence R 314 300-01

Without

objecting, defense counsel replied, "[tjhafs fine, Your Honor " R 314 301
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Then, a few

moments later, as the statement was presented to the jury defense counsel again failed ID
object. SecR. 314:302-04.
Point I, Subsections A and B above illustrate that Dr. Delcore's unsigned out-ofcourt statement was inadmissible hearsay and was improper!}7 accepted in the face of the
Confrontation Clause. Accordingly, based on those evidentiary grounds, the fact that the
hearsay statement was admitted wras objectionable error. In Siatc v. Finlayson^ the Utah
Supreme Court stated that failure to timety object to an unsupported aggravated
kidnapping charge rendered trial counsel's performance deficient and prejudiced the
defendant 2000 UT 10,1fl[ 25-26, 994 P.2d 1243. As the law was clear that the
kidnapping charge was inappropriate!}7 before the court, the Finlayson Court held that
defense counsel had a duty7 to make a timely objection. Id. at ^ 24. Here, like Finlayson,
defense counsel's failure to object to obvious inadmissible hearsay evidence resulted in
representation that fell belowT the objective standard of reasonableness. See id.
This Court has stated that counsel's decisions not to object are given wide latitude
and will not be questioned unless there is no reasonable basis supporting them. State v.
Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, ^J 30, 63 P.3d 110. However, in the instant case there was
no reasonable basis for defense counsel's failure to object. A timely objection on those
grounds specified in Point I, Subsections A and B above, would have precluded Dr.
Delcore's hearsay statement from admission into evidence and from being published to
the jury. At the very least, a timely objection would have forced the State to request a
continuance to present Dr. Delcore's testimony on a later date, allowing defense counsel
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time 10 prepare effective cross-examination. Moreover, given the fact that the
conversations regarding Dr. Delcore's testimony and statement took place outside the
presence of the jury, no prejudice would have resulted from an in-chambers objection.
See Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, % 24.
Finally, "[i]t stretches credulity beyond the breaking point to argue . . . that it is
reasonable to conclude that defense counsel, an experienced criminal lawyer consciously
chose not to seek the exclusion of the testimony about which [Mr. Heil] now complains.
In fact, the precise opposite is true. Competent trial counsel would have made proper
objections and attacked the expert[L]s testimony; there was no rational excuse for not
objecting to the hearsay." Bullock, 791 P.2d at 161 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, the record does not support the contention that defense counsel's failure to
object to Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement was the result of conscious trial strategy.
B.

Defense counsel's inactions prejudiced the outcome of Mr. HeiPs trial.
The second prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel requires a

showing that "[defense] counsel's deficient perfomiance was prejudicial—i.e., that it
affected the outcome of the case." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, Tf 19. In particular, a
defendant must demonstrate that "counsel's error prejudiced him by depriving him of a
fair trial and producing a verdict in which [the appellate court] has no confidence."
Maestas, 2000 UT App. 22, ^ 15.
For the reasons stated above in Point I, Subsection D, Dr. Delcore's hearsay
statement was prejudicial to Mr. Heil's case. In fact, after hearing the substance of Dr.
Delcore's testimony, even the trial judge noted thattaC[Dr.Delcore's] testimony is going to
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be .. . more helpful to the prosecution than to the defense/' R. 314:174. See also R.
314:430 (during the hearing on Mr. HeiPs Motion for New Trial Judge Braithwaite
declared that Dr. Delcore's 'testimony was more beneficial to the prosecution than to the
defense[J" and that it "increas[ed] the chances of conviction[.]"). Had defense counsel
adequately investigated Dr. Delcore's testimony and properly objected to the admission
of his hearsay statement, defense counsel would have been able to procure Mr. HeiPs
constitutional right to confrontation, and expose Dr. Delcore's biases. See Finlayson,
2000 UT 10. ^[j 25-26 (defense counsel's failure to object to inadmissible evidence
prejudiced defendantj. Thus, resulting in a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause.
Defense counsel's failure to adequately investigate Dr. Delcore's hearsay
statement also resulted an obvious flaw, injuring Mr. HeiPs credibility. During his
opening statement at trail, after explaining that Mr. Heil was acting in self defense and
was injured in that effort while being attacked by Mr. Orton. defense counsel informed
the jury that Dr. Delcore. Mr. HeiPs attending physician, would testify about what caused
Mr. HeiPs injury. See R. 314:24-27. However, instead of favorable evidence, the jury
received Dr. Delcore's damaging hearsay statement. See R. 314:303; see also Templin,
805 P.2d at 189 (where testimony affects the credibility of a fact witness who gave direct
evidence, the testimony affects thefitentire evidentiary picture."). If defense counsel had
adequately investigated Dr. Delcore's testimony prior to trial, defense counsel's clear
blunder could have been avoided.
In sum. based on those reasons stated here and above in Point I, Subsection D5
defense counsel's failure to adequately investigate Dr. Delcore's testimony and his failure
object to the admission and publication of Dr. Delcore's hearsay statement reasonably
prejudiced Mr. Heil in that u 'but for [defense counsel's] unprofessional errors, the result
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of the [trial] would have been different.'" Templin, 805 P.2d at 186-87 (citing Snickland,
466 U.S. at 694).
POINT III
THE PROSECUTION'S DECEPTHT ACT OF
AUTHORING AND SUBMITTING A LETTER
PURPORTED TO HAVE BEEN WRITTEN BY DR.
DELCORE, WITHOUT DISCLOSING ITS TRUE
ORIGIN, CONSTITUTED PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT
At the hearing on Mr. Heil's Motion for New Trial, the trial court first learned that
the Iron County Prosecutor, Scott Bums, was the author of the Delcore document, and
that he and Dr. Delcore are "best friends." See R. 314:404-11, 417. While admitting
those facts, the prosecutor claimed that he made full disclosure regarding the origin of Dr.
Delcore's statement at trial. See R. 314:417. However, contrary7 to that claim, the trial
record is silent regarding any alleged disclosure. See record generally. Because the true
origin of Dr. Delcore's statement and his relationship to Mr. Burns were not properly
disclosed, the prosecution's deceitful actions constituted prosecutorial misconduct.
A two-step approach must be taken in determining whether prosecutorial
misconduct occurred. State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 292 (Utah App. 1998). First, this
Court will "examine . . . whether the prosecutor has called the jury's attention to matters
the jury would not be justified in considering." Id, (citations and quotations omitted).
Second, if the first step is met, this Court will determine "whether, under the
circumstances of the particular case, there was a probability that the jurors were
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influenced b\ the prosecutor's [actions]/' Id. (citations and quotations omitted j. Both
steps are met in the instant case.
As shown in Point I, Subsection A, Dr. Delcore's statement constituted
inadmissible hearsay, and was therefore inappropriately brought before the jury. More
importantly, however, this Court has recently stated that 'fraud on the court justifying
relief from judgment include[s] such 'egregious misconduct' as . . . fabrication of
evidence by counsel." Kelly v. Kelly, 2000 UT App 236, f 28 n. 10, 9 P.3d 171. Where
the prosecution authored Dr. Delcore's statement and then offered it to be presented to
the jury as if written by Dr. Delcore. that action constituted fabrication of evidence, and
thus, fraud on the court. See id. ('"'[TJhe term [fraud on the court] . . . must be narrowly
construed to embrace . . . fraud which is perpetrated by officers of the court so as to
prevent the judicial system from functioning in the customary manner of deciding
[issues] in an impartial maimer/") (citations omitted). Clearly the prosecution's
egregious misconduct of fabricating Dr. Delcore's statement and then passing it off to the
court as original, ''called the jury's attention to matters the jury would not be justified in
considering." Finlayson, 956 P.2d at 292.
Lastly, as noted above in Point I, Subsection D(l), the prosecution's introduction
of the Delcore document materially influenced the jury's decision. In addition to those
prejudicial factors, the Delcore document was the last piece of evidence in a two-day trial
presented to the jury, the document directly contradicted Mr. HeiPs version of the
altercation, and placed Mr. HeiPs credibilit} in serious doubt. Irrespective of whether the
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trial court plainly erred by accepting and publishing Dr. Delcore's statement, at the very
least, "there was a probability that the jurors were influenced by the prosecutor's
[egregious misconduct]." See id. Accordingly, where the prosecution committed
prosecutorial misconduct, Mr. HeiPs case should be remanded for a fair and new trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Heil respectfully requests that this court reverse the
trial court's denial of his Motion for New Trial, and remand the case for further
proceedings.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

AMENDMENT VI
rPdcfhts of accused.]
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spe edy

77-17-13. E x p e r t testimony generally — Notice requirements.
• 1) ia« li the prosecution 01 the defense intends to call any expert to testin
in a felony case at trial or any hearing excluding a preliminary hearing
held p u r s u a n t to Poile 7 of the U t a h Exiles of Criminal Procedure, the party
unending to call the expert shall giv«- notice to the opposing party as soon
as practicable but not less t h a n 30 days before trial or ten aays before the
hearing.
(h t Notice shall include the name and address of the expert the experts
curriculum vitae and one of the following
(i) a copy of the expert's report, if one exists: or
(ii) a written explanation of the experts proposed testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the
testimony and
<iii> a notice that the expert is available to cooperatively consult
with the opposmg party on reasonable notice
(CJ The party intending to call the expert is responsible for any fee
charged by the expert for the consultation
(2) K a n expert's anticipated testimony will be based in whole or part on tiie
results of any tests or other specialized data, the parti' intending to call the
witness shah provide to the opposing p a m - the information upon request
(31 As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report or the
information concerning the expert's proposed testimony, the party receiving"
notice shall provide to the other party notice of witnesses whom the parn
anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the niformatioi
required under Subsection ' 1 Kb'
14c) ^a/ If the defendant or the prosecution fails to substantially comply vrW-*
the requirements of this section, the opposing party shah, if necessary ^
prevent substantial prejudice, be entitled to a continuance of the trial or
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony.
(b) If the court finds that the failure to comply with this section is the
result of bad faith on the part of any party or attorney, the court shah
impose appropriate sanctions. The remedy of exclusion of the expert s
testimony will only apply if the court finds t h a t a party deliberately
violated the provisions of this section.
(5) (a) For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary
healing held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
constitutes notice of the expert, the experts qualifications, and a report of
the experts proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by
the expert at the preliminary hearing.
(b) Upon request, the party who called the expert at the preliminary
hearing shall provide the opposing party with a copy of the expert's
curriculum vitae as soon as practicable prior to tidal or any hearing at
which the expert may be called as an expert witness.
(6) This section does not apply to the use of an expert who is an employee of
the state or its political subdivisions, so long as the opposing party is on
reasonable notice through general discovery that the expert may be called as
a witness at trial, and the witness is made available to cooperatively consult
with the opposing party upon reasonable notice.

RULE 705. DISCLOSURE OF FACTS OR DATA UNDERLYING EXPERT OPINION

The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the
underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose
the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.

RULE 801 DEFINITIONS

The follow ing definitions apply undei this article
(aj Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonveiba] conduct of a person if it is
intended by the person as an assertion
(b) Declarant. A. "declarant" is a person who makes a statement
(c) Hearsa}. "Hearsa}" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial oi
hearing offered in evidence to prove the truth of the niattei asserted
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsa}, A statement is not hearsa} if
(1) Prwi Statemem h] Wimess The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declai ant's testrmon} or the witness denies
having made the statement or has forgotten or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut
an expiess oi implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or rmpropei influence oi motive, or (C) one
of identification of a person made after perceiving the person, or
(2) idimssion b) Pari]-Opponent The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the part} s own statement
m either an individual or a repiesentative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the part}7 has manifested an
adoption or belief rn its truth or (C) a statement by a person authorized b} the part} to make a statement
concemmg the subject, oi (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter vithm the scope of
the agenc) oi employment, made during the existence of the lelationship. oi (E) a statement b} a coconsprratoi of a
part} during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy

RULE 803. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; AVAILABILITY OE DECLARANT

ESENLATEIAAL

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or explaming an event or condition made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediate]}' thereafter.
(2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condiiion made while the declarant was under
the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
(3) Then Existing Mental. Emotional or Physical Condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state
of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and
bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it
relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(4) Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the
inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment.
(5) Recorded Recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had
knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have
been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that
knowledge correct!}'. If admitted, the memorandum or record ma}7 be read into evidence but niay not itself be
received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse part}7.
(6) Records of Regularly Conducted Activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the rune by. or from mfomiation
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regular!}' conducted business activity, and if it
was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum., report, record, or data compilation, all
as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule
902(11). Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of mfomiation or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of mis worthiness. The term "business" as used m this paragraph
includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of "every kind, whether or not
conducted for profit.
(7) Absence of Entry in Records Kept in Accordance With the Provisions of Paragraph (6). Evidence that a
matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance
with the provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of
a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the
sources of mfomiation or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthmess.
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Utah Rules of Evidence.. Rule 803
(8) Public Records and Reports. Records., reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public
offices or agencies, setting forth (A.) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to dun'
imposed by law as to which matters there v/as a duty to report., excluding, however, in crmimal cases matters
observed b}? police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and
against the Government m crimiiia] cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to
authority7 granted by lav7, unless the sources of niformation or other circumstances indicate lack of Trustworthiness.
(9) Records of Vital Statistics. Records or data compilations, in an}7 form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or
marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law.
(10) Absence of Public Record or Entry. To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or data
compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or
data compilation m any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency, evidence in the form
of a certification ui accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record,
report, statement, or data compilation, or entry.
(11J Records of Religious Organization. Statements of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry,
relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept
record of a religious organization.
(12) Marriage, Baptismal, and Similar Certificates. Statements of fact contamed in a certificate that the maker
performed a marriage or other ceremony or adimnistered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or
other person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law to perform the act certified,
and purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time thereafter.
(13) Family Records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history contamed ID family Bibles,
genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones,
or the like.
(14) Records of Documents Affecting an Interest in Property. The record of a document purporting to
establish or affect an interest in properly7, as proof of the content of the origmal recorded document and its
execution and deliver}' by each person b}- whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a record of a
public office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in that office.
(15) Statements in Documents Affecting an Interest in Property. A statement contained in a document
purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the
document, unless dealings with the property since the document was made have been inconsistent with the truth of
the statement or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in Ancient Documents. Statements m a document in existence twenty years or more the
authenticity of which is established.
(17) Market Reports, Commercial Publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other
published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by persons hi particular occupations.
(18) Learned Treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination or
relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements contamed in published treatises, periodicals, or
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the
testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements
may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
(19) Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History. Reputation among members of a person's family by
blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth,
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adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other
similar fact of persona] or family hisiory.
(20) Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General Hisiory. Reputation in a conmimnty arising before the
controversy, as to bomidanes of or customs affecting, lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general
history important to the conmiunity or State or nation m which located.
(21) Reputation as to Character. Reputation of a person's character among associates or in the conmiunity.
(22) Judgment of Previous Conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of
guilt)7 (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or
imprisonment m excess of one year, to prove an}' fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when
offered by the prosecution in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than mipeachment, judgments against
persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal ma}7 be shown bm does not affect admissibility.
(23) Judgment as to Personal Family or General History, or Boundaries. Judgments as proof of matters of
personal, family or general history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by
evidence of reputation.
(24) Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregomg exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of tmstworthrness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact: (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than an}- other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement
ma}' not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse parry sufficiently
in advance of the trial or hearmg to provide the adverse party7 with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it the
proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it including the name and address of the
declarant.

[Amended effective November 1. 2001.]

(a) Definition of Unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant:
(1) is exempted by ruling of the coun on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of
the declarant's statement: or
(2) persists hi refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement despite an order of the
coun to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lacl: of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearmg because of death or then existing physical or mental ilhiess
or nnnimry; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement has been unable to procure the
declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable means.

A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence
is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing
the witness from attending or testifying.
(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a
witness:
(1) Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearmg of the same or a different proceeding, or
in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding,, if the party against
whom the testimony is now offered, or, m a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest had an opportunity
and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct cross, or redirect examination.
(2) Statement Under Belief of Impending Death. In a civil or criminal action or proceeding, a statement made by
a declarant while believing that the declarant's death was iniminent. if the judge finds it was made in good faith.
(3) Statement Against Interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniar}7 or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person hi the declarant's position would not have
made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability
and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the
musTworthiness of the statement.
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{4s Siaiemem of Personal or Family Hisioiy. (A) A statement concerning, the declarant's own birth, adoption,
marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by blood., adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of
•personal or family history7, even though the declaram had no means of acquiring persona] knowledge of the matter
stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was
related to the other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimate]}7 associated with the other's family as to be
likely to have accurate niformatioii concerning the matter declared.
(5) Other Exceptions, A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but havhic
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines thai (Aj the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact: (Bj the statement is more probative on the point for which ii is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However., a statement
may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes laiown to the adverse parry sufficienth7
in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse part}' with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it. the
proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it. including the name and address of the
declarant.

ADDENDUM B

STATEMENT OF RANDY G. DELCORE
My name is Randy G. Delcore. I am an orthopaedic surgeon and on or about
August 26, 2001,1 treated Jeffrey Hei] for an injury to his right scaphoid (wrist/ hand
region of the body).
Mr. Heil reported to me that he received this injur}7 by being struck with a
wrench by another person. While this scenario is possible (I suppose in this
life anything is possible) in my opinion the injury is consistent with Mr. Heil
striking another person with his right hand, causing the wrist (hand) to rotate
backward and thus causing the injury....not blunt force trauma from a wrench
f
or other instrument. And f ^
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I apologize that I cannot be present in Court today, but I did not receive a
Subpoena until Wednesday, May 1, 2002, therein requesting my appearance on
Friday, May 3, 2002. On this date, Friday May 3, 2002,1 am performing seven
(7) surgeries beginning at 6:30 A.M., and I do not anticipate completing my work
until 4:00 P.M. or 4:30 P.M. at the earliest.
DATED this

day of May, 2002

Randy G. Delcore, M. D.

